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Timber Capital Gains- The Option Rule
of Section 63 1(b)
By Painiu F. PosTNwArr*
In 1943 Congress enacted the predecessor of section 631 of the
Internal Revenue Code,' section 117(k), 2 with the intention of be-
stowing upon timber owners capital gains treatment for income de-
rived from the disposition and severance of timber.3 The legislation
was novel in that it provided for preferential treatment regardless of
whether the timber was cut for sale or for use in the taxpayer's trade
or business 4 or was held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of trade or business. 5 Under section 631(a),
a timber owner or one possessing a cutting contract may elect to
treat the cutting of timber as a sale or exchange, thereby qualifying
for capital gains treatment the difference between the timber's fair
market value and the adjusted basis for depletion purposes.6 Sec-
tion 631(b) qualifies for capital gains treatment income derived from
the disposition of timber by an owner who thereafter retains an eco-
nomic interest in the timber.7
Substantial litigation has occurred concerning the applicability
of section 631(b) to timber cutting options. The most recent deci-
a LL.M., 1971, New York University School of Law; J.D., 1970, University of
California at Berkeley; B.A., 1967, Texas Christian University. Member, Washington
and Wisconsin Bars. Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame School
of Law.
1. I.R.C. § 631, S. Rep. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-6 (1943); see I.R.C.
§1231. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 117(k), 58 Stat. 46.
3. Section 117(k) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code and § 631 of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code are virtually identical in their treatment of timber capital gains
and will be used interchangeably throughout this Article. See note 19 infra.
Subsection (c) of section 631 provides roughly equivalent preferential treatment
for coal or domestic iron ore mined in the United States as subsection (b) provides
for timber. The operation of section 631(c) is beyond the scope of this Article.
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.631-2(a)(1) (1960).
4. Under normal circumstances, I.R.C. § 1221(1) would preclude such treatment.
7. I.R.C. § 631(b); see Treas. Reg. § 1.631-2(a)(1)-(2) (1960); I.R.C. § 1231.
6. I.R.C. § 631(a); see Treas. Reg. § 1.631-1(a)(1) (1960).
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sion, Forbes v. United States,8 reaffirmed a lengthy procession of pre-
cedents originating in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,9
holding that such agreements do not satisfy the disposal requirements
of section 631(b). The cutting option issue is of significant concern
to timber owners because such agreements are often utilized in the
timber industry.
Under the typical timber cutting option, the selling taxpayer
enters into one of two alternative agreements with the purchaser.
Under one alternative, similar to the one involved in Forbes, the
timber owner grants the purchaser the right to cut and remove as
much of the timber located on the seller's lands as the purchaser de-
sires. The purchase price is usually a specified amount per thousand
board feet of timber, possibly adjusted for the quality or type of timber
sold. The other alternative specifies and describes the timber to be
cut, the price at which such timber is to be purchased, the workman-
ship standards and obligations to be followed in the cutting and
purchasing operations, and the payment dates for timber purchased.
This type of agreement, however, contains termination provisions
exercisable by either party upon a specified number of days notice.
Such agreements do not represent traditional option contracts in which
consideration, usually in the form of money, is given by one party in
order to obtain from a second party an offer irrevocable for a stated
period of time.10 In the present context, the timber cutting agree-
ments of the type referred to in Forbes are described as options be-
cause the timber purchaser is free to exercise to any extent the cut-
ting rights obtained from the timber owner in return for a promise
to pay a designated amount for any timber that is cut."
The selling taxpayer under an option agreement would prefer to
report the gain on the disposition of the timber as capital gains, pur-
suant to section 631(b), rather than as ordinary income. Such treat-
ment is authorized under section 631(b), which provides as follows:
In the case of the disposal of timber held for more than 12 months
before such disposal, by the owner thereof under any form or type
of contract by virtue of which such owner retains an economic
interest in such timber, the difference between the amount real-
ized from the disposal of such timber and the adjusted depletion
8. 75-1 U.S. Tax Cases f 9126 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
9. E.g., Jantzer v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1960); Ah Pah Red-
wood Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1957).
10. See 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 263 (1963).
11. Compare Grover B. Kelsay, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1232 (1972) with IA A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 259 (1963).
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basis thereof, shall be considered as though it were a gain or loss,
as the case may be, on the sale of such timber.12
Capital gains benefits are thus available if the taxpayer meets a four-
fold test; the taxpayer must (1) be the owner of the timber, (2) dis-
pose of it under any form of contract, (3) have held the timber for
the requisite holding period,13 and (4) retain an economic interest
in the timber to be severed.
The first requirement is met in an option transaction if the selling
taxpayer owns the timberlands from which the timber is to be cut
and sold. Compliance with the holding period requirement in such
a situation is easily determined; it begins on the date of acquisition
of the timber and ends on the cutting date. The retained economic
interest requirement is satisfied if the purchase price is solely contin-
gent upon severance of the timber and is payable at a specified price
per thousand board feet.1 4  The remaining issue for section 631(b)
qualification, therefore, is whether a suitable disposal has been effec-
tuated by the timber owner. The Internal Revenue Service, pursuant
to judicial authority, contends that no disposal actually occurs in an
option transaction when the agreement is made because the purported
purchaser either is not bound to cut and purchase any particular
amount of timber or, by virtue of the termination provisions, may avoid
any such obligation. The disposal occurs upon severance of the tim-
ber at which time, however, no economic interest is retained by the
seller.15
This Article will review the case law dealing with the application
of section 631(b) to timber cutting options, the legislative history
and tax policy of section 631(b), and the judicial attitude regarding
such agreements prior to the enactment of section 631. This material
supports the conclusion that the courts, and consequently the Service,
have been unduly restrictive in interpreting the disposal requirement
of section 631(b). Option agreements meet the requirements of that
12. I.R.C. § 631(b).
13. Under prior law the holding period was 6 months; however, the 1976 Tax
Reform Act increased the holding period to 9 months for the year 1977, and to one
year for the year 1978 and thereafter. Pub. L. 94-455 § 1402 (b) (2).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b) (1954); Dyal v. United States, 342 F.2d 248 (5th
Cir. 1965).
15. See Jantzer v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1960); Ah Pah Redwood
Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1957). It should be noted that the
parties'- activities prior to entering into an apparent option agreement may give rise
to the argument that an enforceable binding contract exists, notwithstanding the option
language, once the facts and circumstances are analyzed. For purposes of this Article,
however, it is assumed that this cannot be shown.
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section, and gains derived from such disposals of timber should re-
ceive capital gains treatment, provided the other requisites of section
631(b) are met.
Ah Pah Redwood v. Commissioner: The Ninth Circuit's Error
The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ah Pah
Redwood Co. v. Commissioner'1 defined the disposal requirement of
section 631(b) as requiring a binding bilateral contractual arrange-
ment between the parties in a timber cutting contract. 17 As a con-
sequence of that definition, timber cutting options have not been
included within the class of transactions that receive preferential tax
treatment pursuant to section 631(b).
In Ah Pah Redwood, the taxpayer purchased timberlands in Oc-
tober 1947 and shortly thereafter authorized an affiliate, Coast Red-
wood Co., to commence cutting timber for a sales price of five dollars
per thousand board feet of timber as removed. Coast began its cut-
ting operations in 1947 and continued its activities until January 1950,
paying the Ah Pah Redwood Company the agreed price for the cut
timber. The taxpayer, Ah Pah Redwood Company, in its returns for
1948 and 1949, claimed all monies received from Coast after April
of 1948, six months after it acquired its interest in the timberlands,
as long term capital gains under section 117(k) (2), the predecessor
of section 631(b). The Service took the position that the receipts
from Coast were ordinary income rather than capital gains and assessed
a deficiency against the Ah Pah Redwood Company. The Tax Court
agreed with the Service. 8
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Ah Pah Redwood Company
argued that the necessary disposal of its timber did not occur at the
time it entered into the agreement with Coast but rather that it oc-
curred at the time the timber was cut and purchased. It was appar-
ently forced to adopt this position because, at the time of the agree-
ment, it had not owned the timberland for more than six months,
and consequently, could not otherwise comply with the statutory
holding period.' 9 Ah Pah Redwood Co. characterized the agreement
as a license to cut timber coupled with an offer to sell any timber that
16. 251 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1957).
17. Id. at 167.
18. Ah Pah Redwood Co., 26 U.S. Tax Cas. 1197 (1956).
19. 251 F.2d at 165-66. Subsequently, the section was amended by Congress to
provide that "the date of disposal of such timber shall be deemed to be the date such
timber is cut" instead of the earlier contract date. I.R.C. § 631(b).
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was cut. It claimed that such an agreement was not a contract be-
cause it was unsupported by consideration and, therefore, could not
satisfy the contract requirement of section 117(k) (2). Alternatively,
the company argued that, even if the agreement were a contract, it
was subject to revocation and, consequently, did not constitute a dis-
posal of the timber at the time it was made.20  The Service, on the
other hand, took the position that the 1949 agreement between the
company and Coast represented a disposal of the timber at the time
it was made, thus disabling the company's claimed tax preference for
failure to meet the necessary statutory holding period.2'
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the taxpayer, finding that no dis-
posal occurred at the time the agreement was entered into. It con-
cluded that, for the purposes of section 117(k)(2), the necessary
disposal of timber occurred at the time both parties incurred a binding
obligation under the agreement:
[Tihe stipulated facts concerning the arrangement between peti-
tioner and Coast ... indicate that no contract was entered into
in October, 1947. Under that arrangement, petitioner "allowed"
Coast to "start cutting timber" and "pay $5.00 per thousand feet
as removed." Coast was under no obligation to remove any tim-
ber, and accepted no risk with respect to timber not removed.
Petitioner received no consideration in any form at the time of
the October, 1947 arrangement ... [It] was not a "disposal,"
within the meaning of subsection (k) (2), and does not stand in
the way of characterizing the later cutting and payment transac-
tions as such "disposals ."22
Despite the court's agreement with the taxpayer on the nature of the
disposal requirement of section 117(k) (2), however, it determined
that the retained economic interest requirement of section 117(k) (2)
had not been met; under the company's characterization of its trans-
actions with Coast, the sale and payment had occurred at the same
time.23
Thus, the doctrine of Ah Pah Redwood was premised upon the
taxpayer's argument that the disposal did not occur upon the making
of a cutting option agreement between a timber owner and purchaser.
Subsequent decisions have followed the Ah Pah Redwood rationale
20. 251 F.2d at 166.
21. Id. at 167.
22. Id.
23. The court stated, "We also hold, however, that these later cutting and pay-
ment transactions, which occurred between April 1948 and the end of 1949, were not
within subsection (k)(2), because they did not represent disposals in connection with
which the owner retained an economic interest in such timber." Id.
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without further analysis of the issue. 24 The subsequent cases have
never evaluated the holding of Ah Pah Redwood from the standpoint
of policy, legislative history, or established precedent.
A few observations concerning the Ah Pah Redwood decision
should be noted. The Ninth Circuit, in defining a timber disposal,
cited no authority for its position. There was no discussion of pre-
vious decisions involving section 117(k) (2) or of the law preceding
its enactment, and, more importantly, no analysis of the section's
legislative history or leading commentators' explanation of its oper-
ation. 25
Ample authority, ignored by the Ninth Circuit, mandates a dif-
ferent result in cases concerning timber cutting options. The various
grounds upon which the decision in Ah Pah Redwood can be faulted
are discussed below.
Erroneous Interpretation of the Term Disposal as a Modifier of the Term
Contract
Much of the Ninth Circuit's position regarding the application
of section 117(k) and, thus, section 631(b) to option agreements is
premised upon a close definitional relationship between the term
disposal and the statutory phrase "any form or type of contract."26
Instead of recognizing a unilateral agreement or a licensing agree-
ment as fulfilling the contract requirement, the court in Ah Pah Red-
wood concluded that the term disposal was an important modifier
which required a transaction from which neither party could with-
draw. The legislative history and subsequent judicial interpretations
of section 631(b), however, demonstrate that the term disposal was
not intended to modify or amplify the "any form of contract" re-
24. Jantzer v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1960); Forbes v. United
States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cases if 9126 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
Typical of subsequent decisions is the Tax Court opinion in George L. Jantzer
stating: "The oral arrangement between the partnership and the corporation could be
terminated at will and the corporation accepted no risk, gave no consideration and was
under no obligation to cut any amount of timber. Thus the arrangement was not a
contractual disposal of the Onn timber but was in the nature of a continuing offer to
sell, which offer was accepted by the corporation with respect to each tree through
the corporation's act of cutting, manufacturing, and paying for that tree." 32 T.C.
161, 172 (1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1960).
25. See Briggs & Condrell, Tax Treatment of Timber, 5 Tnasa TAx J. 1, 54
(1969).
26. Section 631(b) begins: "In the case of the disposal of timber held for more
than . . . months . . . by the owner thereof under any form or type of contract by
virtue of which such owner retains an economic interest in such timber ......
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quirement but instead was intended to limit the types of forestry
activity to which the benefits of section 631(b) were to be extended.
In United States v. Brown Wood Preserving Company,27 the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit indicated that the term "dis-
posal of timber" was used to clarify the fact that timber, not timber
products such as turpentine or parts of felled timber, qualified for
preferential treatment under section 117(k)(2). The court, in de-
nying application of section 117(k)(2) to the granting of rights to
extract turpentine, stated: "[T]he phrase 'disposal of timber' ordi-
narily means a true disposal by means of severance of standing
trees. . . . If Congress had intended to extend capital gains treat-
ment to products derived from the sap of a standing tree, it would
certainly have used more appropriate language than 'disposal of tim-
ber.'"28  Thus, the term disposal was intended to modify the term
timber and not the section's contractual requirement.
This interpretation comports with the Congressional policy un-
derlying the enactment in 1943 of section 117(k) of encouraging the
severance of timber to facilitate the war effort. -9 In addition, it is
supported by the Service's approach in Revenue Ruling 56-434, 30
which held that section 631(b) is not applicable to a sale of felled
limbs for pulpwood extraction.
As evidenced by the authority discussed above, the term "dis-
posal" was intended only to modify the term timber and not to place
a limitation on the type or form of contract between the parties in-
volved in a timber transaction. Once a taxpayer enters into an op-
tion agreement for the cutting of standing timber, a disposal has been
effected that satisfies the requirement of section 631(b).
License Agreements as Disposals
An additional shortcoming of Ah Pah Redwood and subsequent
decisions is their inability to reconcile basic contract law with previous
holdings that a timber license may constitute a disposal under sec-
tion 631(b). The Tax Court, having determined that the term dis-
posal modifies the term contract, concluded that in terms of tax law
the concept of a disposal had traditionally been very broad and that
27. 275 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1960).
28. Id. at 529.
29. Id. at 527 -28.
30. 1956-2 C.B. 334. See also, Lefevre, Tax Aspects of Timber Transactions, 18
N.Y.U. INst. FED. TAx 577, 585-87 (1960); Rev. Rul. 57-9, 1957-1 C.B. 265; Treas.
Reg. § 1.631-2(e)(3) (1957).
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Congress had intended to grant the benefits of section 631(b) to
timber owners who disposed of their timber by means short of out-
right sale. 31  Timber licenses and timber cutting contracts, as well
as outright sales, came within the disposal requirement of section
631(b). 32
In the case law, the principal difference between a license and
a cutting option is that under those agreements characterized as li-
censes there has been some expression of intent between the parties
31. Springfield Plywood Corp., 15 T.C. 697 (1950).
32. Id. at 702. The Senate Finance Committee stated that the use of cutting
contracts gave rise to adverse tax consequences for the timber owner and that § 631(b)
was intended to remedy this problem. "[O]wners who sell their timber on a so-called
cutting contract under which the owner retains an economic interest in the property
are held to have leased their property and are therefore not accorded under present
law capital-gains treatment of any increase in value realized over the depletion
basis. . . . If an owner of timber disposes of it under a contract by virtue of which
he retains an economic interest in such timber, the amount received by such owner
is to be treated in a similar manner [to § 117(k)(1) regarding election for capital
gains treatment for cutting timber].
"This latter provision will afford relief to those who have leased their property
under a contract whereby they retain an economic interest in the timber and are not
entitled under the present law to capital gains treatment because of that fact." S. Rep.
No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1943).
The term cutting contract has frequently been defined. One early commentator
noted a definition that identified a cutting contract with a license: "In essence, a
timber-cutting contract (sometimes called 'timber lease') is merely a license granted
by the owner of timber permitting the cutting of timber on his lands." Shatley,
Capital Gain Under Section 117(k)(1) of the Code, 31 TAXES 132, 135 (1953). See
also Lefevre, supra note 30 at 587-88.
One commentator, speaking of the application of section 117(k)(2) stated: "A
common arrangement to which this subsection applies is the cutting contract under
which the owner of the timber authorizes the vendee to go upon the lands of the
owner, cut and remove certain timber, for which the owner is to be paid on a specified
basis such as a fixed sum per thousand feet cut, with the owner retaining both title
to the land and to the timber until cut. The subsection applies, however, no matter
what the contractual arrangement, if the taxpayer has owned the timber for more
than six months prior to the date of the contract and retains an economic interest in
the timber .... ... Hamilton, Gain or Loss on the Cutting and Disposal of Timber,
23 FLA. L.J. 307, 312 (1949).
Another commentator noted that "it is clear that the language of the statute is broad
enough to cover a 'contract for sale' as well as a 'lease."' His footnote regarding the
term lease states: "A normal timber 'lease,' depending on its terms, may under state
law be a license, a lease, or a contract for sale, but this is not determinative for tax
purposes." Gambrell, Income Taxation of Timber Transactions, 20 GA. B.J. 172, 176
(1957). See also, Hamilton, Gain or Loss on the Cutting and Disposal of Timber, 23
FLA. L.J. 307, 312 (1949) in which the author concludes that the term lease as utilized
by Congress was not intended to be limited in its definition by traditional property




that the cutter will take all of the timber or all of a particular type
of timber from the owner's land, but under the option agreement the
purchaser does not necessarily manifest an intent at the outset to cut
all the timber.33  The obligations and duties of a party under a li-
cense, however, differ from those under a bilateral contract and more
closely resemble those under a typical option agreement in that the
purchaser is free to cut as much timber as seems desirable. In timber
law, generally "a mere parole license to cut and remove timber is
revocable at any time prior to its exercise to such extent as to confer
upon the licensee a property right in the timber."34  Thus, a license
is terminable at will by either party. By definition, a licensing situ-
ation, like an option, imposes no obligation of removal on the licensee,
and the licensee accepts no risk with respect to timber not removed.35
As a consequence, a mere license could not fulfill the Ninth Circuit's
requirements for capital gains treatment;36 yet the section's legisla-
tive history and the case law37 indicate that licenses were intended
to be included in the methods of disposition allowed under section
631(b).
In Ah Pah Redwood, the Ninth Circuit attempted to distin-
guish earlier precedent allowing licensing arrangements under section
117(k) (2),381 by holding that in order to qualify for the preferential
tax treatment afforded by that section, any disposition must be con-
tractual.30 Such a requirement, however, ignores the fact that a li-
cense is readily distinguished from a bilateral contract by virtue of the
permissive nature of a license.
To require bilaterial contractual disposal in order to meet the
requirements of section 631(b) should disqualify licensing agree-
ments; yet, earlier precedent accepted by the Ninth Circuit indicates
that a license satisfies the disposal requirement of section 631(b)
33. Compare L. D. Wilson, 26 T.C. 474 (1956) and Springfield Plywood Corp.,
15 T.C. 697 (1950) and Lowes Lumber Co., 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 727 (1960) with
Jantzer v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1960) and Ah Pah Redwood Co.
v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1957) and Forbes v. United States, 75-1
U.S. Tax Cases f[ 9126 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
34. 52 AM. Jun. 2d Logs and Timber § 59 (1970).
The conclusion that timber licenses are revocable at %vil has been firmly recog-
nized by a number of jurisdictions. See Gerry v. Johnston, 85 Idaho 226, 378 P.2d
198 (1966). Cf. Rouse v. Roy L. Houck Sons' Corp., 249 Or. 655, 439 P.2d 856
(1968) (license for removal of rocks).
35. See note 32 supra.
36. Ah Pah Redwood Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 163, 167 (9th Cir. 1957).
37. Springfield Plywood Corp., 15 T.C. 697 (1950).
38. 251 F.2d at 167.
39. Id.
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despite the underlying permissive nature of the license.40  The Tax
Court in Springfield Plywood Corp.4 ' had considered the term "dis-
posal" and concluded that Congress intended that the term include
not only sales contracts but licensing arrangements as well. In that
case, the taxpayer executed an agreement providing for the severance
of timber within a stipulated time period. If the timber were not
removed by that date, the purchaser was bound to pay for it without
further rights thereto. The contract appeared to be a sales contract
under Oregon law with a conditional time for removal; however, be-
cause the licensing agreement was entered into before the six month
holding period for long term capital gain treatment was fulfilled, the
taxpayer was compelled to argue that the transaction was merely a
"license to cut" 2 and disposal occurred with the cutting of each tree.
The court discussed the definition of "disposal" in the context of
whether only a sale rather than a license was intended by Congress
to fall within section 631(b). It concluded that the term "disposal"
was sufficiently broad to include transactions other than sales, includ-
ing leases and licensing agreements. 43  The court apparently found
that a sale had occurred and thus a disposal existed under section
631(b) but held alternatively that, even had no sale occurred, a dis-
posal would still exist because that term was intended to include
licensing arrangements. 44
Subsequently, the Tax Court in 1956 held that a timber pur-
chase agreement, strikingly similar to the option situation in Ah Pah
Redwood, complied with section 631(b)'s requirements. In L. D.
40. See Springfield Plywood Corp., 15 T.C. 697 (1950).
41. 15 T.C. 697 (1950).
42. Id. at 701.
43. The court stated: "[T]he statute requires, not sale, but 'disposal' of the
timber, and that the terms 'disposal' or 'dispose of' are, on high authority, broader
than 'sell.' In Phelps v. Harris, 101 U.S. 370, 380, we find 'The expression to dispose
of is very broad, and signifies more than to sell. Selling is but one mode of disposing
of property.' . . . In United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, it was held that the power
of Congress under Article 4, Section 3 of the Constitution to 'dispose oF public lands
authorized leasing of lead mines thereon . . . . In Hill v. Sumner, 132 U.S. 118 . . .
[the Court held that 'dispose of' is not synonymous with 'sell,' [and] looked to the
purpose of the arrangement and contract .... " Id. at 701-02. See also Dayton Brass
Castings Co. v. Gilligan, 267 Fed. 872 (1920); Koerner v. Wilkinson, 90 Mo. App.
510, 70 S.W. 509 (1902); Rider v. Cooney, 94 Mt. 295, 23 P.2d 261 (1932); St. Louis
Trust Co. v. MacGovern & Co., 297 Mo. 527, 249 S.W. 68 (1923). The Gratiot de-
cision specifically involved an option agreement.
44. 15 T.C. at 703. See also Boeing v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 581 (Ct. Cl.
1951) (leases); Gambrell, Income Taxation of Timber Transactions, 20 GA. B.J. 172
(1957).
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Wilson,45 the individual taxpayer formed a partnership with several
other persons, and the partnership entered into a purchase agreement
whereby it bought at a fixed price all the standing timber on a par-
ticular tract of land. Under Oregon law, this agreement granted
the partnership equitable title to the timber before it was cut. The
partnership later entered into an agreement with a corporation by
which it transferred its cutting rights to the corporation. Under the
agreement, the purchasing corporation was allowed to cut the timber
at its option. No specific amount of timber was required to be cut
or sold; the corporation could sever the timber as its needs arose.
Notwithstanding these provisions and the fact that the corporation
was under no obligation to remove any timber, the Tax Court con-
cluded that the partnership had disposed of the timber in a manner
that qualified under section 631(b) .46
It is arguable that the Tax Court's conclusions would have been
different had Ah Pah Redwood been decided at the time the Tax
Court rendered its decision in L. D. Wilson. The Tax Court, how-
ever, maintained its position after Ah Pah Redwood in Lowes Lumber
Co.,47 distinguishing Ah Pah Redwood on its facts. The agreement
in Lowes Lumber Co., involved a licensing arrangement whereby the
buyer was granted the right to enter the taxpayer's land and cut tim-
ber, paying for it on an as cut basis.48 The court noted the Service's
position that
the timber cutting contracts were simply unilateral licenses to
enter and cut the timber, which were not binding on either party,
and hence, did not constitute a disposal of the timber at the time
the contract was made, and consequently, the timber was not
disposed of until a tree was cut and paid for, after which time
the partnership retained no economic interest in the timber.49
Closely following its reasoning in Springfield Plywood Corp., the court
rejected this argument and concluded that the agreement constituted
a bilateral sales contract. Even though the agreement was revocable,
the taxpayer had presumably agreed to sell all the timber on its land,
and by implication the purchaser agreed to buy all of it."0 The
court, however, did comment favorably on the Wilson case and con-
cluded that even if the agreement constituted a licensing arrange-
45. 26 T.C. 474 (1956).
46. Id. at 481.
47. 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 727 (1960).
48. Id. at 730-31.
49. Id. at 738.
50. Id. at 738-39.
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ment rather than a sale, Congress intended to extend the benefits
of section 631(b) to such transactions. 51
The Tax Court, therefore, maintains the position that section
631(b) is intended to apply to licensing situations. Timber licenses
and options are similar legal agreements; no duty exists on the part
of the party holding the license or option to exercise its right to cut
any timber, but the party is bound to pay if and when it chooses to
do so. Accordingly, because the timber owner in a licensing situa-
tion is entitled to report timber gains under section 631(b), the tim-
ber owner in an option situation is entitled to receive the same tax
treatment. Although the Ninth Circuit concurred with the early
decision of the Tax Court regarding licenses, it did not consider the
option agreement in Ah Pah Redwood to be a suitable disposal of
the timber. This position fails to recognize and account for the per-
missive nature of both a license and an option agreement.
Qualification of Timber Purchase Agreement for Section 631(a) Treat-
ment Insures Qualification of Timber Sale Agreement for Section 631(b)
Treatment
Another indication that the Ninth Circuit was in error regarding
the qualification of timber cutting options for section 631(b) treat-
ment is that such agreements have been held to bestow capital gains
treatment upon the timber purchaser under section 631(a). 52 Sec-
tions 631(a) and 631(b) generally complement each other and allow
a seller and a purchaser both to qualify for preferential treatment.
If the purchasing taxpayer qualifies for capital gains advantages un-
der section 631(a), the selling taxpayer in such a situation should
qualify under section 631(b) for similar treatment.
Section 631(a) provides that a taxpayer may make an election
to report a portion of the income from the cutting and sale of timber
as capital gains if that taxpayer "owns, or has a contract right to cut,
such timber (providing he has owned such timber or has held such
contract right for a period of more than twelve months .... )"53
This section and section 631(b) have a unique interrelationship. By
virtue of the language, "has a contract right to cut," in section 631(a),
Congress intended the timber purchasing taxpayer to be the logical
contractual counterpart to the selling taxpayer subject to section
51. Id.
52. See United States v. Johnson, 257 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1958); Grover B. Kelsay,
31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1232 (1972).
53. I.R.C. § 631(a).
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631(b) treatment. Commentators and courts have described this
interrelationship as a double capital gains benefit. 54
The use in section 631(a) of the term "contract right," and sec-
tion 631(b)'s language, "disposal... under any form or type of con-
tract," indicate that both parties to a timber transaction may qualify
for capital gains treatment, subject to three limitations. First, the
taxpayer with a contract right to cut timber must, at the time of
severance, possess a proprietary interest in the timber. Second, the
section 631(b) taxpayer must retain an economic interest in the tim-
ber and be entitled to payments conditioned on severance of the trees.
Third, each taxpayer must meet the requisite holding period estab-
lished in both sections. Where these requirements are met by both
parties, the qualification by one party for section 631(a) or (b) treat-
ment should automatically ensure qualification of the other for similar
treatment.
55
Both subsections employ the term "contract," and logical inter-
pretation of that term requires that it be defined similarly for sections
631(a) and (b). Case law and Treasury regulations state that a
contract right to cut timber requires that the taxpayer "must have
a right to sell the timber cut under the contract on his own account
or to use such cut timber in his trade or business.""6 The taxpayer
must not only have a contract right to cut the timber, essentially a
proprietary interest, but must have held this right for the requisite
holding period.57  In order to acquire and hold a contract right for
the requisite period, the agreement must have been validly executed,
and the proper period must have elapsed before the severance of any
timber. The conclusion mandated by utilizing the Ninth Circuit's
rationale that in option situations the agreement between the parties
is merely a continuing offer to sell is that the purchaser could not
hold a contract right to cut any timber. Consequently, the seller's
failure to meet the requirements of section 631(b) by failing to dis-
pose of the timber by contract should equally doom the purchaser's
section 631(a) election; the purchaser also does not possess any con-
tract right for the required holding period.
54. See Lowes Lumber Co., 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 727 (1960); Hamilton, Gain or
Loss on the Cutting and Disposal of Timber, 23 FLA. L.J. 307 (1949); Liles, Federal
Income Tax Treatment of Timber Transactions Under Sections § 631(a) and (b) of the
Internal Revenue Code, 2 ABA BuLL. SECTION TAx. 47, 49 (1968).
55. See Little, Federal Income Taxation of Timber, 40 Miss. L.J. 217, 226 (1969).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.631-1(b)(1); Helga Carlen, 20 T.C. 573, 577 (1953), aff'd,
220 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1955).
57. I.R.C. § 631(a).
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Case law, however, has held that contracts virtually identical with
timber cutting options qualify under section 631(a) .58 In United
States v. Johnson," the Ninth Circuit considered a timber purchaser's
assertion of entitlement to capital gains treatment under the pre-
decessor of section 631(a). The transaction resembled an option
situation; the agreement was a license subject to termination pro-
visions that ran in favor of the licensor. In contrast to the typical
option situation, the taxpayers in Johnson were expected to log the
timber before a certain date.60 Under the Ah Pah Redwood rationale,
the retention of the termination provision should have rendered the
agreement merely a continuing offer to sell the timber. The Johnson
court, however, concluded that the purchasing taxpayers were en-
titled to elect section 631(a) treatment because, in effect, they had
held a contract right for the requisite time period.6 1
A similar conclusion was reached by the Tax Court in Grover B.
Kelsay.62  In Kelsay, the taxpayer was authorized to cut timber under
an irrevocable option. The court, without any citation of case law,
concluded that the requirements of section 631(a) had been met:
A right to cut is nothing more than an "option." It implies
no obligation on the part of the holder of such right. Section
631(a) does not require that the taxpayer seeking to claim ben-
efits have a binding contract to cut timber which is in effect for
a period of 6 months prior to the taxable year. All the statute
requires is that the taxpayer have an enforceable right, exercisable
at its option, to cut such timber.63
Thus, under the Johnson and Kelsay rationales, either a licensing
or an option agreement to cut timber is sufficient to meet the require-
ments of section 631(a). The Kelsay case further indicates that
the Service did not contest section 631(a)'s applicability to a pay-
as-you-cut agreement that placed the taxpayer under no obligation
to cut timber. While Kelsay involved an irrevocable agreement, its
conclusion should be undisturbed even if it had been revocable be-
cause, prior to any revocation, the right to cut timber exists and this
right is the sole requirement of section 631(a).
Because a unique relationship exists between section 631(a) and
58. United States v. Johnson, 257 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1958); Grover B. Kelsay,
31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1232 (1972). See also Rev. Rul. 74-529, 1974-2 C.B. 185.
59. 257 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1958).
60. Id. at 532.
61. Id. at 534.
62. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1232 (1972).
63. Id. at 1236.
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section 631(b), a transaction that qualifies one party under one of
these sections for capital gains treatment should likewise qualify the
other party to the transaction for capital gains treatment under the
other section. Courts have specifically held that a timber cutting
option can meet section 631(a) requirements, and, therefore, a simi-
lar conclusion should be reached for option agreements under section
631(b).64
Legislative Intent and Public Policy
Hearings prior to the enactment of section 117(k) (2), the prede-
cessor of section 631(b), illustrates the types of situations to which
these sections were intended to apply. Testimony at these hearings
indicates that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, which requires a
binding commitment to cut and purchase timber, is erroneous.
The House Ways and Means Committee in 1943 heard testimony
from a representative of the Forest Industries Committee on Timber
Valuation and Taxation who criticized the discrimination against the
timber industry inherent in the existing system of taxation and pro-
posed a remedy. The remedy proposed was essentially adopted by
the Ways and Means Committee as its original proposal for sections
117(k)(1) and 117(k)(2). The proposal provided for the qualifi-
cation of a broad range of transactions for capital gains treatment.65
The representative stated as a principle of reform:
[a] taxpayer, who has disposed of his timber through a so-called
cutting contract or similar form of contract where legal title is re-
tained by the vendor to secure the performance of such contract,
should be entitled to treat any excess of the amount received for
such timber over the cost or other basis thereof as a capital gain.66
64. In Timber Conservation Company v. United States, the court stated that "the
tests of qualifying under one section by the purchaser and of qualifying under the
other by the seller are so similar that cases under one section are valuable precedents
in determining the law under the other, and this Court accepts them as such." 208
F. Supp. 626, 630 (D. Ore. 1962). See also Lowes Lumber Co., 19 T.C.M. (CCH)
727 (1960); Lefevre, supra note 30, at 583-84.
65. "In case of the disposal of timber by the owner thereof under any form or
type of contract by virtue of which the owner retains an economic or investment in-
terest in such timber, including but not limited to a cutting contract, a contract con-
strued as a lease or royalty contract, or a contract under which legal title to such timber
is retained in the owner to secure the performance thereof, then the difference be-
tween the amount received for such timber and the adjusted depletion basis thereof
shall be considered as though it were gain or loss." Hearings before House Committee
on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1943, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 795, 797
(1943) (emphasis added) (statement by Lovell H. Parker).
66. Id.
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He intended that timber licenses and cutting options fall within this
class of transactions that satisfy this principle. 7
Congress in its final enactment of section 117(k) (2) used the
terminology, "under any form or type of contract," which was most
probably intended to cover those contracts referred to by the rep-
resentative. Congress was attempting to implement an incentive
provision which would grant economic benefits to timber owners. As
noted by the Court of Claims, "The legislative history of 117(k) indi-
cates that Congress' principal purpose was to afford relief to timber
owners. ' s Thus to implement properly the legislative intent, the
provisions of 117(k) and 631 should be liberally construed.
Most likely Congress intended to grant the benefits of section
631(b) to those kinds of business transactions that occur regularly
in the forestry industry. The methods whereby timber owners sold
their timber in the years immediately preceding the enactment of the
legislation included both licensing and option agreements. '9 The as-
sumption that Congress was trying to ensure that the mere retention
67. In addition to his testimony, the representative submitted a supplemental
statement regarding timber tax reform and therein cited various examples of the ap-
plication of the proposed section 117(k). His examples illustrate a licensing situation,
an open ended agreement under which the purchaser is not obligated to cut a specific
amount of timber. His example (c) provided: "Smith, by a contract made in 1940,
has a right to cut and remove the timber from 2,000 acres of land owned by Jones.
The contract provides that on the 10th of each month Smith is to pay Jones $4 per
thousand for the logs scaled and removed during the previous month. During 1943
Smith removes 10,000,000 feet of logs. On January 1, 1943, the trees which pro-
duced the logs removed had a fair market value of $6 per thousand. Smith has re-
alized a capital gain of $2 per thousand which is treated like the capital gain of $3
per thousand in example (a). Also, as in (a), the adjusted basis of $4 per thousand
becomes $6 per thousand as of January 1, 1943, and there is no change in the adjusted
basis for the timber not scaled and removed in 1943.
(e) Under the basis conditions described in example (c) Jones contracted to
dispose of his timber to Smith at $4 per thousand. Jones, on January 1, 1943, had
an adjusted basis for the timber removed by Smith in 1943 for $2 per thousand. Con-
sequently, Jones has a capital gain of $2 per thousand and is accorded treatment
under proposed section 117(k)(2); the $2 capital gain is taxed at not to exceed 25
percent. There is no change in the adjusted basis of the uncut timber owned by Jones
and included in the Smith contract." Id. at 806.
Thus, the example cited qualifies as a typical option agreement. The disposal
is piecemeal, occurring with the passage of time and the purchaser's efforts. No total
amount of timber is required to be cut by the purchaser under the hypothetical agree-
ment, and assumptively, the seller has the right to terminate the contract at will. The
important indicia of disposal is severance and payment; a situation identical with li-
censing agreements.
68. Boeing v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 581, 584 (Ct. Cl. 1951). See also 90
CONe. REC. 1965 (1944) (statement by Sen. Alben Barkley).
69. See P. BurrTCK, FoREST ECONOMIES AND FINANCE, 368-70 (1943).
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of an economic interest in an agreement to dispose of one's timber
was the determinative criteria for section 631(b) qualification, and
not the extent of the contractual rights between the parties, is logical.
Furthermore, section 631(b)'s complement, section 631(a), refers
to the purchaser's right to cut timber rather than an obligation to do
so. The Ninth Circuit and other courts have laid undue emphasis
on the term "disposal" and have thus created legal precedent that
does not conform to the intent of Congress.
Even if the legislative history and authorities did not mandate
the conclusion that option agreements fulfill the requirements of sec-
tion 631(b), in the absence of any negative language indicating an
intention to exclude such agreements, no violation of public policy
or legislatiye intent occurs by extending the benefits of section 631(b)
to such arrangements.7 0  Congress by the use of the term, "any form
or type of contract," intended to allow timber owners the utmost flex-
ibility in structuring their transactions. The method of disposition
was immaterial so long as an economic interest was retained. Li-
censing and option agreements comport with this intent.
In the timber industry representative's testimony before the
House Ways and Means Committee, five basic reasons for extending
preferential treatment to the timber industry were stated; such treat-
ment is justified for the following purposes:
(1) in order to allow forest owners and operators to manage their
properties according to sound business considerations instead of
being governed by tax reasons; (2) in order to correct present
serious tax discriminations; (3) in order to give a tax treatment
suitable to the circumstances of the industry, which, without the
possibility of insurance, must face serious physical and economic
hazards over long periods of time; (4) in order to encourage the
war effort and put the industry in a position where it can meet
present needs and provide post-war employment; and (5) in
order in the public interest to promote better protection of for-
ests, and to encourage and expand the practice of forestry.71
None of these policy considerations is offended by extending the ap-
plication of section 631(b) to an option agreement. To the con-
trary, an option agreement is consistent with these policies, especially
the first and fifth. A selling taxpayer should be able to choose a
70. Fahey, "Relief" Provisions in the Revenue Act of 1943, 53 YALE L.J. 459
(1944); Boeing v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 581, 583-84 (Ct. CI. 1951).
71. Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Re-
vision of 1943, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 795, 803 (1943). See Hearings before Senate
Committee on Finance on H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 665 (1943) (statement by
Lovell H. Parker).
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licensing or option method of disposition if it best suits business needs.
Congress was also concerned with the development of sound
forestry methods and conservation. Prior income tax law required
that there be an outright sale of the land or timber before an owner
could claim preferential tax treatment. This rule caused owners to
lose control over their land. A timber cutting contract, on the other
hand, provided a vehicle by which owners could retain control of
their land.72  Thus, the new section was intended to enable timber
owners to exercise sound methods of land conservation7 3 and forestry
practice.7 4
Licensing and option agreements provide a method by which the
disposing taxpayer may exercise sound business judgment while ad-
vancing conservation efforts and good forestry practice because the
licensor has the ability to terminate the license if the timber cutter's
practices conflict with the licensor's judgment on these issues.75 Un-
der no circumstances do option agreements violate the rationale
behind section 631(b)'s enactment and, therefore, they should be
considered as one of the types of transactions that come within its
operation.
Tax Treatment of Timber Sales Prior to 1943
Consideration of the events that precipitated the enactment of
72. "Many forest landowners have for many years sold timber from their lands
under cutting contracts, retaining their land together with more or less forest growth
for future production of timber. The cutting contract is a tool of wise forest manage-
ment which should not be driven from use by unsound provisions of tax law. The
cutting contract is a fairer method of selling than the outright sale; it substitutes known
quantities for estimates; it gives better control of cutting procedure - forestry. It helps
the owner of forest property to continue to own and manage his land wisely in his own
and the public interest." Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on
Revenue Revision of 1943, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 795, 804 (1943).
73. The Fifth Circuit stated "The purpose of the provision [Section 117(k)(2)/
631(b)] was to promote conservation, and it should not be used as a means of penal-
izing the taxpayers." Dyal v. United States, 342 F.2d 248, 253 (5th Cir. 1965).
See McHenry, Dowling & Miller, Tax Problems Involved in Timber Leases, 1 TIMBER
TAX J. 1, 16 (1965). See also Union Bay-Camp Paper Corp. v. United States, 325
F.2d 730 (Ct. Cl. 1963); 90 CONG. Rxc. 1949-50 (1944) (remarks of Sens. Taft and
George); Briggs & Condrell, Tax Treatment of Timber, 5 TIMBER TAX J. 1, 3 (1969).
74. In hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, timber industry spokesman
Mr. Lovell Parker stated: "Indeed, good forest management will be strongly stimu-
lated by such amendments and the long range plan of the forest industries to bring
about the continuous productivity of the forests will be fulfilled." Hearings before
Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 3687, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 664 (1943).
75. See Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Re-
vision of 1943, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 795, 824 (1943) (comments of Mr. Reed).
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section 117(k) (2) is necessary in order to understand the purpose
that Congress sought to achieve by this action and, in turn, the con-
flict between that purpose and the Ninth Circuit's position that option
agreements do not satisfy the requirements of section 631(b). Prior
to 1943 the tax consequence of an outright sale of timber or timber-
land was determined under the capital gains rules of the predecessor
of sections 1221 and 1222(3). If the taxpayer was a dealer engaged
in the trade or business of selling timber, the timber did not constitute
a capital asset as defined in section 1221(1) and, therefore, did not
comply with the requirements of section 1222(3), granting capital
gains tax rates. Such preferential rates were available if the taxpayer
held the property in an investment capacity.76
A line of cases developed prior to 1943 that considered the timber
owner's assertion that income received pursuant to a stumpage con-
tract qualified for capital gains treatment. Under this type of con-
tract, the owner retained the title to the timber until it was severed
and removed and payment was made by the purchaser. Courts held
that the income derived from such transactions qualified for capital
gains treatment.7 7  The contention of the Service in these cases was
that stumpage contracts under state law constituted executory con-
tracts with title passing as the timber was cut. Consequently, the
transactions were not a single sale of an asset but instead numerous
sales of timber which resulted in a taxpayer's engaging in the opera-
tion of a trade or business. The Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Robinson 7  rejected this argument and viewed such a transaction
practically and fairly as a single sale. In an alternative contention
advanced by the Service in stumpage contract cases, the purchaser
was classified as an agent of the taxpayer, and the customers of the
purchaser were viewed as the taxpayer's customers. The Service ar-
gued that the selling taxpayer was not entitled to capital gains treat-
ment because the seller was actually engaged in the business of sell-
ing timber. In Estate of M. M. Stark,79 the court rejected this con-
tention, finding that the purchaser of such timber was not the agent
76. See Whitaker, Timber Industry Tax Problems Scope, 1957 TUIAI TA X INST.
104, 131-38; Bohannon, Tax Treatment of Gains and Losses ir Timber and Coal Trans-
actions, 27 GEo. WASH., L. REv. 37, 42,-45 (1958-59).
77. United States v. Robinson, 129 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1942); Isaac S. Peebles,
5 T.C. 14 (1945); Camp. Mfg. Co., 3 T.C. 467 (1944); Estate of M. M. Stark, 45
B.T.A. 882 (1941); John W. Blodgett, 13 B.T.A. 1388 (1928).
78. 129 F.2d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1942).
79. 45 B.T.A. 882 (1941).
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of the vendor, and upheld the treatment of the transaction as the sale
of capital assets.
These pre-1943 agreements, under which the seller was entitled
to capital gains treatment of the income received, were similar to op-
tion agreements in that they granted the right to sever timber but
imposed no obligation on the purchaser other than to remit the stump-
age payment at the time the timber was cut. Under state law, title
to the timber did not pass to the purchaser until the timber was sev-
ered 0 and the sale occurred at that time. The fact that the trans-
action involved only a single purchaser precluded a finding that the
timber owner was engaged in the conduct of a trade or business.
In Isaac S. Peebles,"' the Tax Court specifically held that a timber
owner in a timber cutting option agreement was entitled to report
the income received as capital gains. The agreement granted the
buyer the right to cut timber for a specified period but did not obligate
him to cut any particular amount. The agreement also was subject
to termination upon sixty day notice by the timber owner. Thus,
under pre-1943 law, an option agreement qualified the selling taxpayer's
income for capital gains treatment.
The United States Supreme Court, in Burnet v. Harmel, 2 under-
cut this line of authority by holding that, regardless of the transaction's
characterization under state law, an oil and gas lease did not consti-
tute a sale by the landowner of the mineral content of the soil and
that, therefore, income received pursuant to such a lease could not
be considered as capital gains . 3  The Service in a subsequent ruling
concluded that "parties entitled to share in oil or mineral extracted,
or the gross proceeds therefrom (including the parties to a lease pro-
viding for royalty payments of stated amounts per unit mined), have
economic interests in the oil or mineral in place."84 An owner of
such an interest "had not made a sale: (1) where the owner was
entitled to be paid stated amount per unit mined or extracted .... "85
The result was that in a lease transaction the income derived by way
of rental payments was characterized as ordinary income.
The Service proceeded to apply this rationale to timber cutting
80. See, e.g., Carrie Lutcher Brown, 26 B.T.A. 781 (1932), affd, 70 F.2d 806
(5th Cir. 1934). See also John W. Blodgett, 13 B.T.A. 1388 (1928).
81. 5 T.C. 14 (1945).
82. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
83. Id. at 109-11.
84. 1941-1 C.B. 214, 219.
85. Briggs & Condrell, supra note 25, at 46. See also Whitaker, supra note 76,
at 140-42.
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contracts. It construed them as leases and denied to the timber
owner capital gains treatment for the income received as a result of
such a contract.80
The specter of ordinary income treatment for timber transactions
prompted Congress to enact section 117(k)(2) .87 The Senate's re-
port acknowledged the discrimination precipitated by the Service's
construction of the concept of retained economic interest and pro-
posed to amend the existing law to "afford relief to those who have
leased their property under a contract whereby they retain an eco-
nomic interest in the timber and are not entitled under the present
law to capital gains treatment because of that fact."8
The cases before Burnet indicated that the time of actual passage
of title to the timber from the seller to the purchaser was not relevant
in determining the availability of capital gains treatment to the in-
come received by the timber seller. In enacting section 117(k) (2),
Congress intended to eliminate the problem created by the Supreme
Court's holding in Burnet, which had the effect of denying capital
gains advantages to timber owners who entered into agreements dis-
posing of their timber but who retained an economic interest in it
until the timber was cut. Capital gains treatment was denied be-
cause the Court held that no sale had occurred under such an agree-
ment. Congress intended to ensure the elimination of previous con-
troversies regarding retention of an economic interest. The Legisla-
tive history and various commentators have stated that the enactment
of section 117(k) (2) was an affirmation of all pre-section 117(k) cases
granting capital gains treatment of timber transactions.8 9 Thus, the
Peebles and Robinson fact patterns, specifically involving option agree-
ments, were intended to qualify for preferential capital gains treatment
under section 631(b).
The Ninth Circuit in Ah Pah Redwood refused to recognize
that a disposal of timber, in contrast to a sale, had occurred when
an option agreement was entered into between a timber owner and
purchaser. The court instead characterized the agreement as a con-
tinuing offer to sell; disposal occurred at the time a tree was cut and,
thus, the offer accepted. By so characterizing the transaction, the
timber seller could not qualify for capital gains treatment under sec-
86. Bureau of Internal Revenue Field Proc. Memo No. 249, Feb. 17, 1943.
87. S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1943).
88. Id. at 26.
89. See Boeing v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 581 (Ct. CI. 1951); Whitaker, Timber
Industry Tax Problems Scope, 1957 TuLE TAX INST. 104.
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tion 117(k) (2), or later section 631(b), because no economic interest
had been retained by the seller after the disposal had occurred. This
characterization conflicts with the Congressional purpose underlying
section 117(k)(2) and section 631(b) because it equates the con-
cept of disposal with the sale of the timber instead of recognizing
that a disposal occurs when the option agreement is entered, not-
withstanding the seller's retention of an interest in the timber until
it is sold.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit in the Ah Pah Redwood decision erroneously
concluded that section 631(b)'s preferential treatment is not avail-
able to a taxpayer when timber is disposed of under an option agree-
ment. The court failed to analyze prior precedent, the section's legis-
lative history, and sound policy considerations in reaching its conclu-
sion. Subsequent decisions have repeated the mistake made in Ah
Pah Redwood. The peculiar facts presented in that case may par-
tially explain the court's error. In order to comply with the require-
ments of section 631(b), the taxpayer was forced to contend that
no disposal of timber had occurred at the time the option agreement
was entered. Since then, the statute has been changed so that, if
the identical facts were to arise today, the taxpayer would not need
to make this argument.
In enacting section 631(b), Congress indicated the broad scope
of its intention by utilizing the term, "any form of contract." Any
method of disposing of timber should satisfy the requirements of this
section so long as the seller retains an economic interest in the timber
until it is actually cut. Under an option agreement, a seller has been
found to retain such an interest. Thus, the disposition of timber un-
der an option agreement should qualify for capital gains treatment
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